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Abstract
How should one respond to racial oppression? Conventional prescriptions of mainstream social psychological science emphasize
the idea of coping with oppression—whether via emotional management strategies that emphasize denial or disengagement;
problem-focused strategies that emphasize compensation, self-efficacy, or skills training; or collective strategies that emphasize
emotional support—in ways that promote adaptation to, rather than transformation of, oppressive social structures. Following
a brief review of the literature on coping with racism and oppression, we present an alternative model rooted in perspectives
of liberation psychology (Martín-Baró, 1994). This decolonial approach emphasizes critical consciousness (rather than cultivated
ignorance) of racial oppression, a focus on de-ideologization (rather than legitimation) of status quo realities, and illumination
of models of identification conducive to collective action. Whereas the standard approach to coping with oppression may
ultimately both reinforce and reproduce systems of domination, we propose a decolonial approach to racism perception as a
more effective strategy for enduring prosperity and well-being.
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A popular song as we write this paper is “Happy” by African American songwriter and producer Pharrell Williams.
The song and video, which peaked at number one in over 20 countries and has inspired thousands of fan remakes
across the globe, affirms the power of having a positive attitude and outlook in life. In a recent interview, Williams
attributed part of his success to his “new” way of thinking about race, and particularly about being Black.
The new Black doesn’t blame other races for our issues. The new Black dreams and realizes that it’s not
a pigmentation, it’s a mentality. It’s either going to work for you or it’s going to work against you and you’ve
got to pick which side you’re gonna be on. … I recognize that there are issues. We get judged on our
skin. ... I don’t allow that to run my life. (Winfrey, 2014).
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Williams’ post-racialist position does not wholly deny the realities of racism, but it suggests that a viable solution
for buffering negative effects of racism is to cultivate a cheerful attitude: “Because I’m happy…Can't nothing bring
me down.”
Much research in mainstream social psychology adopts a similar lens about coping with identity-based oppression.i
An emerging consensus of psychological research is that perception or awareness of racism and other forms of
identity-based oppression is itself a psychological stressor that contributes independently to poor outcomes
(Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014). Despite conditions of stark inequality, systemic and epistemic
violence (e.g., Teo, 2008), and other lingering effects of European imperialism and colonialism in the modern
global order—what decolonial theorists refer to as the coloniality of power (e.g., Quijano, 2000)—interventions in
psychological science often target themindset and efficacy beliefs of people from oppressed groups as a prescription
for health and well-being in situations of oppression. In contrast, we draw upon theoretical resources of liberation
psychology to propose an alternative paradigm. From this perspective, the psychological study of racism perception
and well-being reflect the coloniality of knowledge (Mignolo, 2002): that is, preferential deployment of concepts
that (1) have their epistemological foundation in beliefs and desires of a globally dominant minority; and (2) regard-
less of researchers’ intentions or awareness, serve to reproduce further domination. As a result, the struggle
against oppression must include efforts to decolonize conceptions and practices of coping and well-being.
Coping With Oppression: The Dominant Frame
How do people in conditions of oppression navigate the pathogenic environments that they are forced to inhabit?
Reflecting its standing as a “health science,” a dominant framing of this question in mainstream psychology has
been to treat oppressive circumstances as a stressor, which transforms the preceding question into one of “how
do people cope with (the stress of) oppression?” (Williams, Spencer, & Jackson, 1997). Although there is consid-
erable debate and variation among theoretical models of coping, a common feature of virtually all models is an
initial assessment or appraisal, leading to a negative emotional state that the individual must alleviate. The
method a person employs to lessen this negative state depends on the perceived nature of the problem and the
most applicable or efficacious manner to address that problem. While it is beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion to suggest a definitive framework for organizing theory and research on coping more broadly, we provide a
rough categorization of coping processes sufficient to proceed with a discussion of “coping with oppression.” To
this end, we consider the categories of emotion-focused coping, problem-focused coping, and community-based
coping.
Emotion-Focused Strategies
Discussions of coping developed in the context of discussions about general life stressors (Antonovsky, 1979;
Lazarus, 1966). What are the implications of this model when one appropriates it to consider the case of coping
with oppression? Standard perspectives on coping suggest that the preferred response to oppressive circumstances
is to act directly on harmful environments to counteract the problem. However, perhaps reflecting beliefs about
the intractability of oppression, many discussions of coping with oppression in social psychological science consider
emotion-focused coping strategies (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Major & O’Brien, 2005; Miller & Kaiser,
2001; Outten, Schmitt, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009) that treat the psychological symptoms of the problem rather
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than source the problem itself. According to this approach, people can minimize the trauma associated with op-
pression by ignoring or subjectively distancing themselves from the problem.
Denial
One emotion-focused response that people might use to cope with realities of oppression is denial: conscious
rejection or cultivated ignorance of the fact that one inhabits a situation of injustice or oppression. If a person is
unable to act on the source of an environmental threat that will continue to operate indefinitely, she might at least
achieve some peace of mind by blocking knowledge of oppression.
Indeed, social psychological research suggests that denial is a common response to oppression. For example,
research on the personal-group discrimination discrepancy indicates that even in contexts where people in mar-
ginalized communities acknowledge the social reality of identity-based oppression, they may resist recognition of
such instances of oppression in their own lives (Crosby, 1984; Dion & Kawakami, 1996; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam,
& Lalonde, 1990). Denial of oppression is especially pronounced for people and contexts that endorse ideologies
of meritocracy (Choma, Hafer, Crosby, & Foster, 2012; Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007). Contexts that
promote meritocracy tend to place value on self-efficacy and hardiness, values that go hand-in-hand with belief
in a just world and, unsurprisingly, are associated with greater denial of oppression (Foster & Dion, 2003). That
is, those who endorse just world beliefs are the ones most likely to reject the possibility that they, personally, are
victims of unjust discrimination.
Beyond documenting denial as a common response to situations of oppression, mainstream research within social
psychology has reinforced the idea that denial has “benefits.” Much of this work considers the problematic psycho-
logical consequences of racism perception. For example, consider research on stigma consciousness: the tendency
for people to experience themselves in terms of marginalized social identities (Pinel, 1999). Among people from
historically oppressed groups, those who score high on the measure of stigma consciousness not only are more
likely to perceive both personal and group discrimination (Pinel, 1999), but also tend to suffer greater decrements
in performance (Brown & Pinel, 2003) and report lower self-esteem (Pinel & Paulin, 2005) than those who score
low on the measure of stigma consciousness. Similar conclusions emerge from research on race-based rejection
sensitivity: the extent to which people “anxiously expect, readily perceive, and intensely react to rejection” based
on their connection to stigmatized identity categories (Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002,
p. 897). In one study among first-year Black American students at a Predominantly White Institution, those who
scored high on the measure of race-based rejection sensitivity reported more negative race-based experiences
(e.g., experiencing racial profiling on campus) and reported less university belongingness over the course of the
study than did those who scored low on the measure of race-based rejection sensitivity. Implicit in both research
programs is the idea that awareness of racial oppression can be detrimental to well-being, with the further implic-
ation that people might deny or remain ignorant of their racial marginalization to avoid the detrimental consequences
of this awareness.
Besides literal denial, people can also avoid awareness of discrimination or oppression by practicing forms of in-
terpretative denial (Cohen, 2001). That is, people can face the reality of their marginalized position, but construct
their situation in a way other than oppression. For example, in situations where people lack a sense of self-efficacy
and belief in the possibility of social change, they are more likely to seek out justifications for inequality (Stewart,
Latu, Branscombe, & Denney, 2010). Similarly, token systems can create the (false) impression of egalitarianism
by promoting belief in individual mobility (Danaher & Branscombe, 2010). The presence of visible token minorities
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also increases system-justifying beliefs and legitimation of inequality (Brown & Diekman, 2013). Under these cir-
cumstances, people can acknowledge unequal outcomes, but attribute this inequality to something other than
oppression.
To summarize, denial—in both literal and interpretative forms—can be an appealing response when people face
situations of enduring oppression that they perceive to be unavoidable. In that case, one way to manage the
stressful implications of awareness about oppression is to avoid such awareness. Of course, a problem of this
response is that although it may defend against the psychological pain associated with awareness of oppression,
it does not defend against the negative outcomes that one will continue to experience as a result of that oppression.
Disengagement
As an alternative to denial, people might acknowledge that they inhabit situations of identity-based oppression
and then cope with that stressful situation in a more active fashion. If they perceive that they are relatively
powerless to change to the circumstances that oppress them, they might cope through practices of disengagement:
that is, neutralizing the emotional stress of oppression by denying the relevance or importance of the domains
along which the oppression operates.
A prominent example of disengagement in the social psychological literature comes from research on stereotype
threat. This research shows that the anxiety associated with confirming widespread negative beliefs about one’s
group leads to disidentification with the relevant domain (Steele, 1997). Women who face stereotypes of deficiency
in mathematical skills relative to men, or people of African descent who face stereotypes as less intelligent than
people of European descent, can maintain a sense of equanimity in the face of barriers by claiming that their
performance in these domains is not important or self-relevant (Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003; Schmader, Major,
Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001; Stone, 2002).
To the extent that disengagement reflects tendencies for people in situations of identity-based oppression to crit-
ically examine (and decide whether to invest in) mainstream systems of value, it can have important effects of
generating alternatives to mainstream ways of being. More frequently, though, disengagement takes the form of
concession by abandoning interests or pursuits in which people would otherwise engage. This strategy meets
self-protective needs, but it ultimately can reinforce negative stereotypes and prejudices. For example, if a woman
disengages in mathematics, she will likely perform poorly in this area, providing additional evidence that women
in general lack mathematical skills (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999). So, on the one hand, disengagement
strategies allow individuals to avoid feelings of rejection, disappointment, or diminished value. On the other hand,
by failing to confront oppressive circumstances and representations, disengagement strategies serve to reproduce
realities of domination. In this regard, disengagement is good for individuals yet directly contributes to collective
realities of continued oppression.
Problem-Focused Strategies
Theory and research on coping proposes that the most effective means to respond to stressors is to face problems
directly when possible. However, when considering responses to oppression, social psychological theory and
research suggest that problem-focused strategies in the context of oppression can be ineffective or even counter-
productive, especially to the extent that they focus efforts on individual-oriented strategies that are ineffective at
addressing systems of oppression. Two such examples of these strategies are compensation and empowerment.
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Research suggests that people from historically oppressed groupsmaymodify their behaviors in order to counteract
negative consequences of oppression. Oftentimes such strategies are deployed in the context of personal exper-
ience with oppression in anticipation of, or direct response to, racism. In these cases, people may specifically try
to behave in a stereotype-inconsistent fashion (Kaiser & Miller, 2001) or in a particularly socially skilled manner
(Miller, Rothblum, Felicio, & Brand, 1995) so that biased individuals will be unable to justify discriminatory treatment.
This is consistent with the notion of the “Black tax,” where people of African descent feel that they must work
harder and be better than non-stigmatized Whites in order to achieve comparable standing or be taken seriously
(Cohen, 1998; Whiting, 2009). Similarly, research shows that women speak to their employers with greater com-
petency than with their peers, while men show no differences in speech patterns based upon audience (Steckler
& Rosenthal, 1985). These measures attempt to cut off oppressive practices before they begin by removing any
a priori rationalizations for poor treatment.
However, compensation suffers from a number of shortcomings. Compensation efforts communicate that individuals
must change themselves and adapt to society, thereby leaving unchanged the societal norms and practices that
constitute oppressive realities. Moreover, as the notion of a “Black tax” suggests, the extra effort and energy that
people from oppressed groups must expend to secure fair or standard treatment comes with significant personal
costs. These costs include health problems in the form of both negative health characteristics (e.g., hypertension)
and behaviors (see Bennett et al., 2004, for a review).
Empowerment
Another problem-focused strategy for coping with oppression—one that figures prominently in popular discourse—is
empowerment. Research suggests that empowerment of people from historically oppressed groups leads to in-
creased psychological well-being and better coping with daily oppression (Johnson, Worell, & Chandler, 2005;
Parsons, 2001; Prestby, Wandersman, Florin, Rich, & Chavis, 1990; Zimmerman, Israel, Schulz, & Checkoway,
1992). Across various conceptions of empowerment, a number of consistent themes emerge. These include self-
efficacy, fostering personal beliefs about one’s own capabilities; skill development, encouraging people to work
to acquire characteristics necessary to succeed within oppressive systems; and connection-building, so as to
provide individuals with access to broader and deeper networks of social capital and material resources than they
can access as individual actors.
In theory, empowerment approaches hold promise as a response to oppression, especially to the extent that they
promote awareness of the systemically embedded nature of inequality and mobilize people to collective action.
In practice, though, conventional articulations of empowerment strategies within social psychological science fall
short of this promise, frequently through a failure to acknowledge or consider systems of power that that constrain
individual action (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998). Rather than mobilizing people to dismantle the environmental
or structural sources of oppression, conventional articulations of empowerment turn attention inward and mobilize
people to change themselves and better adapt to situations of oppression. To the extent empowerment strategies
emphasize skill development and other forms of individual action, they do little to create social change and also
reproduce oppression for self and others. Empowerment strategies are most effective when they focus on collective
mobilization, or attempts to enact social change (Bookman &Morgen, 1988; Gutiérrez, 1994; Perry, 1980; Schecter,
1982). However, such conceptions of collective empowerment await development.
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Community-Based Strategies
In contrast to the explicitly individual-level focus of most research on coping—and particularly coping with oppres-
sion—the emphasis on social support as a coping strategy explicitly acknowledges the fundamentally social or
collective character of human existence. By definition, identity-based discrimination and oppression are collective
phenomena; this suggests that people who experience discrimination-related stress or trauma can draw upon
their identity-relevant communities to manage the negative effects of such experiences.
Social Support
One response to the experience of oppression is to seek support from similar others who share one’s negative
experience. Research suggests that such forms of social support can buffer individual well-being from some
negative consequences of oppression. For instance, research on lesbian women’s perceptions of oppression
finds a positive relationship between perception of (hetero)sexism and experience of psychological distress.
However, the availability of social support serves a protective function, buffering lesbian women from the distress
otherwise associated with awareness of sexism and heterosexism (Szymanski & Kashubeck-West, 2008).
Social support requires the presence of other, like-minded people with whom to share one’s experience of oppres-
sion. Unfortunately, people may not always have access to such a resource. In these cases, the absence of social
support may itself constitute a stressor that compounds the effects of oppression (Hughes & Eliason, 2002). Indeed,
across settings, a common domination strategy has been to deny people from oppressed groups the opportunity
to build communities of support. This strategy was evident in North American practices of slavery, where slave
owners denied enslaved humans the opportunity to marry or maintain family bonds (e.g., between siblings or
between parents and children). This practice not only destroyed potential bases for solidarity, but also deprived
enslaved people of an important source of relational and ontological security upon which to base acts of resistance.
More recently, supporters of the ban on state funding for ethnic studies programs in Arizona (USA) specifically
mentioned the concern that these programs promote ethnic solidarity as a rationale for the ban (HB 2281, 2010).
What is the “active ingredient” of social support? Some research suggests that social support itself may not directly
remedy the negative effects of oppression, but rather may operate to promote other discrimination-buffering
characteristics through processes such as social validation and shared reality (Fischer & Holz, 2007). Drawing
upon a community with similar histories of discrimination and oppression gives credence and substantiation to
one’s own experience of bias. The support and understanding of people who share, recognize, and validate one’s
experiences of oppression can be an important psychological resource that reduces the negative consequences
of these experiences. They provide the sense that one is not crazy after all, despite the fact that one’s perceptions
deviate from mainstream accounts of “objective” reality (Whaley, 1997, 1998). To the extent that the “active in-
gredient” of social support is this sort of reality-validation function, it constitutes a decolonial approach to coping
that we discuss in a subsequent section.
Collective Identification
Similar to social support, collective identification may also serve as a community-based coping mechanism. Re-
search suggests that identification with an oppressed group may lead to greater well-being in the face of adversity.
In particular, the rejection-identification model (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999) proposes that the experience
of oppression (and implication of societal rejection) can lead people to identify more strongly with oppressed group
identity categories. In turn, the positive benefits of greater identification buffer people from the negative con-
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sequences that would otherwise result from the experience of societal oppression and rejection. Researchers
have observed support for the rejection-identification model among people from a variety of oppressed groups,
including women (Redersdorff, Martinot, & Branscombe, 2004), international students in the United States (Schmitt,
Spears, & Branscombe, 2003), gay men (Chae & Yoshikawa, 2008), and people with body piercings (Jetten,
Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001).
One advantage of collective identification versus social support is that, unlike the latter, the former does not require
the physical presence of others. Accordingly, collective identification can provide some of the benefits of social
support (e.g., solidarity, reality validation), even in circumstances where people who share and recognize one’s
experience are not physically present. However, collective identification also shares some of the same disadvant-
ages of social support. Briefly stated, the prevailing sense of these community-based coping strategies is to distract
individual focus away from shared negative experience(s) to a sense of belonging in communities of meaning
and value (Landrum-Brown, 1990; Thoits, 1986). Although this feeling of belonging may provide genuine relief
from the negative consequences of oppression, it constitutes a short-term buffer from the negative impact of discrete
experiences of oppression that will do little to decrease the likelihood of future oppression for one’s self or oth-
ers—that is, unless it also promotes complementary action to address unjust systems.
Summary
As a response to stress associated with situations of oppression, mainstream discussions of community-based
coping have similar limitations as mainstream discussions of coping in general. Specifically, their focus on alleviation
of symptoms that manifest at the level of individual experience implies resignation to realities of oppression and
suffering. Rather than working with similar others to eliminate the sources of oppression, community-based
strategies use these others as a means of ego-defense or ego-restoration. In other words, they promote short-
term accommodation or individual adaptation to stressful circumstances, rather than long-term transformation of
the oppressive structures that underlie the stressful circumstances. In this way, conventional discussions of coping
in mainstream psychology reflect the coloniality of knowledge. That is, they not only promote an individualist
construction of well-being that resonates with the atomistic ontology of European modernity, but also reproduce
ongoing domination by naturalizing and failing to challenge the status quo.
Beyond Coping: Decolonial Responses to Oppression
In contrast to mainstream perspectives on “coping” with oppression, we propose a framework that moves beyond
the alleviation of negative states and/or ego restoration to actions that promote liberation. The conceptual roots
of this framework lie in a variety of sources, especially the “liberation psychology” of Ignacio Martín-Baró (1994;
see also Bulhan, 1985; Montero & Sonn, 2009; Shulman & Watkins, 2008). A key feature of many liberation psy-
chology perspectives is an emphasis on what subsequent scholars have referred to as the coloniality of knowledge
(e.g., Mignolo, 2007): the extent to which conventional accounts of social reality in mainstream sites of knowledge
production (i.e., academia or news media) are not objective or neutral, but instead reflect perspectives of the
powerful, pathologize experiences of the oppressed, and serve to reinforce domination. From this perspective,
effective responses to structures of oppression require a process of mental decolonization involving the production
of liberatory knowledge that has its foundation in the lived experience of people in oppressed communities. The
epistemological perspective of the oppressed not only serves as a tool for critical consciousness about the
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structural causes of suffering, but also provides a basis for identification and collective action to secure broader
well-being. As a means of decolonizing knowledge and promoting responses to oppression with greater social
justice potential, Martín-Baró (1994) proposed three pressing tasks for a liberation psychology: de-ideologizing
everyday experience, utilizing people’s virtues, and the recovery of historical memory. In the current paper we
consider the insights that these tasks provide not only regarding limitations of mainstream psychological science,
but also for illuminating a decolonial response to oppression.
From Emotion Management to Critical Consciousness
As we noted in the section on emotion-focused approaches to coping with oppression, mainstream perspectives
in social psychology tend to pathologize awareness of oppression. The basic idea that permeates mainstream
understandings is not only that awareness of oppression comes with psychological costs (e.g., stress, anxiety,
and/or depressive affect), but also that the mere perception of oppression can be sufficient to generate its own
negative outcomes—thereby increasing the marginalization of people in marginalized communities. Rather than
promoting vigilance against the threat of unavoidable oppression, these perspectives suggest that people could
be spared psychological pain and further marginalization if they somehow avoid awareness of this threat. The
noteworthy implication of this mainstream perspective is not only that it valorizes ignorance or denial (of the real-
istic threat of oppression) as a viable way of coping, but also that it elevates ignorance and denial as a standard
against which vigilant awareness appears as deviant.
Unlike mainstream emotion-based strategies of denial of or disengagement from oppression, a decolonial response
to oppression demands awareness, attention, and analysis of one’s marginalization. Against the background of
mainstream skepticism about consciousness of oppression, a fundamental feature of various liberation psychology
perspectives is to validate and draw upon the experience of people from oppressed or marginalized communities
as a privileged moral and epistemological space (i.e., to “utilize the people’s virtues”, Martín-Baró, 1994, p. 31).
This feature is a variant of the liberation theology principle of a preferential option for the oppressed, which in the
present context refers to an epistemological framework that privileges the understandings of people in oppressed
communities as a source of insight or truth about the character of social reality.
As an illustrative example, consider research on group differences in perception of racism in U.S. society. Research
consistently demonstrates that White Americans perceive less racism in mainstream society than do people from
subordinate racial groups (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Feagin, 2006, 2009; for a similar pattern in South Africa see
also Durrheim, Mtose, & Brown, 2011). Mainstream accounts of this difference tend to focus on Black Americans’
perception of racism as the anomalous or deviant pattern that requires explanation. In contrast, the decolonial
idea of accompaniment with people in marginalized communities as a privileged site of knowledge (see Tomlinson
& Lipsitz, 2013; Watkins, 2015, this section) affords the recognition that group differences in perception of racism
may be less about Black American perceptions than White American denial. One source of racism denial is the
process of motivated perception. White Americans are motivated to deny the extent of racism to enable guilt-free
enjoyment of racial privilege and defend the legitimacy of the social order from which they derive benefit (Adams,
Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006). Another source of racism denial is cultural knowledge. Regardless of personal motiv-
ation, White Americans often perceive less racism than people from oppressed groups because they rely upon
sources of cultural knowledge—including representations of history (Nelson, Adams, & Salter, 2013) and atomistic
conceptions of racism as individual bias (Adams, Edkins, Lacka, Pickett, & Cheryan, 2008)—that afford ignorance
of racism. The epistemological perspective of marginalized communities provides tools to disrupt racism denial.
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When White Americans gain exposure to forms of historical knowledge or conceptions of racism that resonate
with the experience of people in marginalized communities, they tend to admit greater racism in American society
(Adams, Edkins, et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 2013; Salter & Adams, 2015)
The epistemological perspective of people in marginalized spaces can be an important resource for critical con-
sciousness not only about the reality of systemic oppression, but also about the likely effectiveness of various
responses to that oppression. Critical consciousness, or conscientização (Freire, 1970/1993) refers to a reflexive
understanding of the world and recognition of the interconnectedness of individual, social, and structural experience
(de Lauretis, 1990; Freire, 1973; Gurin, 1985; Gurin & Townsend, 1986). Critical consciousness requires an in-
depth engagement with the social world and examination of structural systems that set limitations on well-being
through discriminatory practice. Once people understand the social practices that maintain inequality, they will
be better able to organize action to dismantle structures of domination and construct more just realities.
The emphasis on critical consciousness as the foundation for decolonial responses to oppression stands in direct
contrast to mainstream perspectives in social psychology that advocate denial of oppression. Decolonial approaches
do not dispute that consciousness of oppression is a potential source of stress; instead, they emphasize awareness
of oppression and its sources as a necessary precursor to action against oppressive circumstances. If one is not
aware of oppression or unsure of its source, then it is difficult to mobilize action to address the source. Rather
than suppress awareness of oppression in order to maintain a sense of positive affect and personal empowerment,
a decolonial response advocates not only unflinching awareness about the reality of oppression and its sources,
but also conceptual tools—the critical in critical consciousness—for challenging conventional understandings of
oppressive situations.
Problem-Focused Strategies of Empowerment, Re-Focused
To the extent that mainstream perspectives in social psychology have articulated problem-focused approaches
to coping with oppression, they have tended to emphasize responses, such as compensation and individual em-
powerment, that promote individual well-being and success despite oppressive systems. In other words, the focus
of these problem-focused empowerment strategies is changing people to better navigate oppressive systems
rather than changing the pathogenic environments that people in situations of oppression must navigate. Implicit
in this construction is the idea that the “problem” that requires focus and correction is one of individual maladjustment
rather than social injustice. In contrast, the critical consciousness associated with decolonial responses to oppression
identifies pathogenic environments—not the people who must navigate them—as the source of the problem that
requires an effective response.
Although decolonial responses to oppression share with mainstream perspectives a concern about empowering
people to overcome the challenges of an oppressive environment, differences in conceptions about the location
of the problem promote differences in the construction of (dis)empowerment. Mainstream approaches seek to
empower individuals by providing them with skills and motivations necessary to overcome oppressive barriers
and succeed in terms of conventional understandings of success. Although these skills and motivations may
promote individual well-being, they reinforce the legitimacy and re-produce the reality of the oppressive systems
that contribute to ill health and disease in general.
In contrast, the focus on critical consciousness within decolonial responses to oppression suggests an alternative
conception of (dis)empowerment. In this conception, the source of everyday disempowerment is not a deficiency
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of skills or motivation, but rather forms of violence. The foundation of oppressive systems lies in material forms
of physical violence that the powerful wield in extraordinary outbursts that impose death, dislocation, and dispos-
session on vanquished communities. However, the everyday maintenance of oppressive systems also entails an
ideological and epistemic kind of violence: an iron fist dressed in a velvet glove that makes it difficult to recognize
the destructive power that the fist wields (e.g., Jackman, 1994). These forms of ideological or epistemic violence
operate by legitimizing regimes of domination, portraying them as a natural and inevitable reality (Teo, 2008,
2010). Dominant ideologies disempower people by obscuring the extent to which present realities are the direct
results of ongoing (and racialized) historical violence and by co-opting people to endorse and reproduce the
ideological systems that contribute to their own domination.
Drawing on this understanding, an important consideration of decolonial responses to oppression is to switch the
focus of problem-focused coping away from skill development to what Martín-Baró (1994) identified as the second
pressing task for a liberation psychology: the “de-ideologization [desideologizar] of everyday experience” (p. 31).
This idea emphasizes that dominant discourses and everyday understandings of social reality are ideological
products that have emerged and persist because they reflect and reproduce the interests of domination. Mainstream
forms of knowledge production (e.g., media or academic discourse) often re-present the status quo as the inevitable
progression of a natural process of societal evolution, obscuring the ideological character of everyday reality. By
portraying existing realities as the just natural product of societal progress, dominant discourses serve to obscure
the coloniality of everyday life; that is, they constrain awareness that existing realities are the product of identity-
based domination, not a neutral environment with equal opportunity for all. This denial of ideological positioning
ultimately serves to naturalize and justify social injustice, as it suggests that inequality results from group differences
in capacity or willingness to take advantage of supposedly equal opportunities. In contrast, the epistemological
perspective of the oppressed provides conceptual tools from which to de-ideologize everyday experience.
Readers familiar with Euro American social psychology will recognize a connection between our discussion of
alternative attributions for inequality and research on the self-evaluative consequences of attributional ambiguity
(e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991). This influential body of work has emphasized
that people who are frequent targets of discrimination experience considerable ambiguity about the feedback they
receive. They can attribute the feedback to something about them (e.g., the actual quality of their performance),
or they can attribute the feedback to something about the perceiver (e.g., stereotypes, prejudice, or some other
identity-based bias). In contrast to the dominant thread of research in mainstream social psychology that tends
to associate attributions to discrimination with negative impact on well-being, researchers have noted that people
from oppressed groups can take advantage of this attributional ambiguity to deflect the otherwise negative self-
evaluative implications of biased feedback and other discriminatory outcomes. That is, making attributions to
prejudice in the face of ambiguous negative feedback and system-blame attributions for societal disparities can
have self-protective properties (Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Crocker & Major, 1989).
The idea that stigmatized groups might attribute outcomes to prejudice to deflect personal blame and protect self-
esteem has been controversial. In particular, critics note the implication that tendencies for people frommarginalized
communities to perceive oppression may reflect, not more accurate understanding about the reality of racism, but
instead strategic motivations to “play the oppression card”: that is, to exaggerate the extent of oppression to deflect
personal and collective blame (Garcia, Reser, Amo, Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005; cf. Crocker & Major, 2003).
Apart from the implication of motivated exaggeration, the important distinction between the notion of critical con-
sciousness and work on the self-evaluative implications of attributional ambiguity concerns the outcome of interest.
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The perspectives are similar in that they both emphasize the positive effects of perceiving (rather than denying)
that outcomes are due to oppression. The perspectives differ in what they imagine these positive effects to be.
Research on self-evaluative implications of attributional ambiguity shares with mainstream perspectives a focus
on emotion-focused coping, in the form of consequences for individual self-regulation. In contrast, the focus on
motivated systems of dominance is less concerned with emotion or other forms of individual self-regulation and
more concerned with promoting critical consciousness of oppression and empowering people in oppressed
communities by orienting them toward opportunities for collective action.
Collective Empowerment: Identity-Based Meaning and Action
One response to the work on attributional ambiguity is the rejection-identification model (Branscombe et al., 1999)
that we discussed in the previous section on community-based coping. This model proposes that it is not the at-
tribution of outcomes to oppression, per se, that produces positive consequences for well-being. Indeed, attributions
to pervasive oppression, by themselves, are likely to produce less well-being to the extent that they trigger the
outcomes that other researchers have associated with stigma consciousness or racial rejection sensitivity (for a
review, see Schmitt et al., 2014). Instead, the rejection-identification model suggests that attributions to pervasive
discrimination result in decreased well-being unless they trigger increased identification with the oppressed
community, which then buffers people from the otherwise negative consequences (Branscombe et al., 1999). In
other words, consciousness of discrimination may contribute to well-being to the extent that it allows people to
access collective resources for resilience (Outten et al., 2009) in response to identity-threatening situations (see
Neville & Pieterse, 2009).
An important consideration for decolonial responses to oppression, then, concerns the forms of critical conscious-
ness that promote collective identification. In recognition of this important consideration, the third pressing task
in the Liberation Psychology of Martín-Baró (1994) is recovery of historical memory. In the words of Martín-Baró,
The prevailing discourse puts forth an apparently natural and ahistorical reality, structuring it in such a
way as to cause it to be accepted without question. This makes it impossible to derive lessons from ex-
perience and, more important, makes it impossible to find the roots of one’s own identity, which is as
much needed for interpreting one’s sense of the present as for glimpsing possible alternatives.… The
recovery of historical memory supposes the reconstruction of models of identification that, instead of
chaining and caging the people, open up the horizon for them, toward their liberation and fulfillment. (p.
30)
The importance of critical consciousness to the topic of collective identification lies in dismantling representations
of history that reflect and reproduce forms of domination and replacing them with alternative forms of collective
memory that reflect and promote identification with perspectives of people in oppressed communities.
Evidence for the effect of “recovered” historical memory in promoting support for reparative action comes from
an investigation of displays for Black History Month (BHM) that we conducted in secondary schools of a city in
the mid-western USA (Salter & Adams, 2015). We observed that schools with majority White populations were
more likely than majority Black (and Latino) populations to de-emphasize struggles against racism and to link
BHM to larger issues of cultural diversity rather than Civil Rights. This relative prominence of different Black History
Month representations in the material reality of different school environments is not inconsequential, but instead
affords different courses of action. In this case, BHM displays from predominately Black and Latino spaces afforded
increases in perceptions of racism among White American participants, which in turn mediated support for anti-
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racism policies (Salter & Adams, 2015). In other words, representations from schools with a majority of Black and
Latino students afford support for anti-racism policies because they alert viewers to the ongoing significance of
racism in contemporary U.S. society. The recovery and broad distribution of representations of history that afford
perception of racism and support for reparative action constitute a productive and liberatory response to situations
of oppression.
Summary: Decolonizing Coping
An emphasis on the recovery of historical memory and development of critical consciousness constitutes a shift
away from strategies that implicitly or explicitly advocate adaptation (i.e., to oppressive systems) toward strategies
that focus on social transformation. This alternative focus illuminates the coloniality of knowledge in mainstream
social psychology and “coping only” response strategies. Mainstream psychological science places a heavy em-
phasis on reducing stress via adaptation to local realities. But what if these realities are inherently oppressive (as
decolonial critiques suggest of the modern global order)? Conventional scientific wisdom implies that the healthy
course of action is for people to cope with the situation by adapting themselves to the oppressive social order
rather than acting in some fashion to transform it. In this way, mainstream psychological science acts as a conser-
vative force that promotes not only resignation to, but also legitimization or naturalization of an unjust status quo.
It elevates oppressive constructions of reality to the status of a natural standard to which individual actors must
successfully adapt, and implicitly de-legitimizes attempts to transform those oppressive realities. As we have
noted repeatedly, this adaptationist stance to oppressive realities may bring short-term benefits, but it is inimical
to long-term or collective well-being if those oppressive realities are the root of the pathology in the first place.
In contrast to mainstream psychological constructions of coping that emphasize individual adaptation to oppressive
realities, a decolonial response to oppression emphasizes social transformation. Rather than elevate the unjust
status quo to the level of natural or inevitable, a decolonial response to oppression de-naturalizes the status quo
by revealing it to be the project of violent repression and injustice. Rather than grudging resignation to the oppressive
status quo, decolonial responses encourage imagination of social justice alternatives to the status quo.
Our focus in this paper is a reconsideration of mainstream perspectives that advise people from historically op-
pressed communities to adapt to, rather than challenge systems of oppression. As a result of this focus, we have
not considered the implications that decolonial responses to oppression have for people who benefit from racial
and colonial domination. Such people have even more motivation than people from marginalized communities to
deny the extent of global oppression, as recognition of this oppression threatens the legitimacy of the racialized
global order from which they benefit. Given this motivation, people from dominant groups are perhaps especially
likely to develop epistemological tools that both prevent recognition of oppression and afford a construction of the
racialized global order as the natural or inevitable product of modern progress and cultural development. By allowing
these epistemologies of ignorance to persist unchallenged, mainstream responses to coping with oppression help
reproduce domination.
In contrast, decolonial responses to coping promote critical consciousness (rather than identity-enhancing denial),
disrupt epistemologies of ignorance that naturalize the racialized injustice of the modern global order, and illuminate
models of identification (e.g., imagination of community with broader humanity) that afford dis-investment in the
racialized injustice of the modern global order. In other words, decolonial responses to coping seek not only to
liberate people in marginalized communities from ongoing racist and colonial violence, but also to liberate people
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in dominant communities from forces that compel them to perpetrate (often in mindless fashion) forms of racist
and colonial violence.
Implications for the Task of Decolonizing Psychology
To conclude this contribution to the special section, we step back from the particular discussion of decolonial ap-
proaches to coping and examine implications that this discussion raises for the project of “decolonizing psychology”.
The general strategy is one that informs many contributions to the special section. In particular, we draw upon
the epistemological perspective of people in oppressed communities for insights and alternatives to prevailing
understandings of well-being, consciousness, and peace.
Beyond Individual Bodies: Decolonizing “Well-Being”
A first implication for decolonizing psychological science concerns limitations of a psychology rooted in individualism
(Bulhan, 1985; Fanon, 1961/1965; Martín-Baró, 1994). What Martín-Baró noted of mental health—namely, that
“mental health is a dimension of the relations between persons and groups more than an individual state” (1994,
p. 109)—applies to the concept of well-being in general. The atomistic focus in medical and psychological science
on individual bodies as the locus of health obscures the social foundations of well-being. This focus is not only
inadequate for understanding the suffering produced by systems of oppression, but also acts as an ideological
foundation for reproducing oppression.
The atomistic conception of well-being that prevails in mainstream psychological science judges phenomena on
the basis of their capacity to provide an individual person with maximum happiness or self-actualization. Accordingly,
psychological science tends to valorize ways of being that bring short-term benefits to isolated actors, regardless
of the long term or broader social consequences of those ways of being. In contrast, as the present discussion
of racism denial suggests, ways of being that fulfill self-defensive motivations in the present may not prove adapt-
ive—that is, they may not equip people well to navigate local realities—in the long run. Moreover, the “winning”
or optimal strategies that maximize benefits for an individual actor might not be winning or optimal strategies for
an aggregate or community of individuals. For example, beyond a certain threshold, individual accumulation of
wealth may not lead to increases in individual well-being. However, accumulation of wealth concentrated in the
hands of the few does result in low overall well-being (Oishi, Kesebir, & Diener, 2011; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).
This is not only because the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few comes at the cost of less wealth in the
hands of the global multitude, but also because inequality is harmful for the sense of community and trust that
provide people in general—including the wealthy—with the ontological security necessary for a sense of daily
equanimity and well-being.
Beyond “Perceptual Baggage”: Decolonizing “Consciousness”
An additional implication of our discussion for decolonizing psychological science concerns implications for ap-
proaches to consciousness. Mainstream perspectives in social psychology have tended to emphasize burdens
of knowledge about systemic oppression. Conventional scientific wisdom in mainstream psychology suggests
that the “excessive” focus on racism or oppression as a force in everyday society produces stigma consciousness,
cultural mistrust, race-based rejection sensitivity, or some other forms of “perceptual baggage” (Johnson, Simmons,
Trawalter, Ferguson, & Reed, 2003, p. 621) that put people at risk for poor outcomes. The implication is that
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people would have better outcomes if they didn’t carry around the perceptual baggage of consciousness about
oppression.
There are (at least) two problematic issues to note regarding this “perceptual baggage” framing. The first issue—and
most relevant for the topic of decolonizing well-being—is to question the extent to which consciousness of oppres-
sion is productive of poor well-being. Yes, a large body of empirical research indicates that people who tend to
perceive identity-based oppression in ambiguous situations or in society as a whole are at risk for a variety of
harms that one might summarize as depressive affect and disengagement from mainstream cultural spaces as
a self-protective defense mechanism. Perhaps people could avoid the negative affective consequences of con-
sciousness about oppression if they didn’t carry around perceptual baggage: that is, if they cultivated blissful ig-
norance and trained themselves not to be aware of oppression. However, this short-term affective benefit (which,
as we have noted above, tends to align with the short-term focus of psychological research on well-being) may
be relatively insignificant compared to two different sets of harms.
One set of harms that comes into view when one extends the focus to a larger temporal frame is the violence and
negative affect that people would incur if they naively remained invested in oppressive spaces where they face
devaluation and barriers to positive outcomes. After all, the idea that people defensively disengage suggests that
they are doing so to prevent harm from some kind of threat. Research on the experience of people in oppressed
minority groups has documented the toll that everyday oppression—both spectacular violence and the more typ-
ical slow violence (Nixon, 2011) of everyday micro-aggressions—takes on their well-being. To the extent that
awareness of oppression helps people avoid these forms of aggression, they can avoid the negative consequences
associated with them.
Another set of harms comes into view when one extends the focus from individual to collective outcomes. By
cultivating ignorance about oppression, mainstream approaches provide people in marginalized spaces with little
basis for changing the oppressive circumstances. How can people from marginalized spaces address their mar-
ginalization if they give in to system-justifying motives to see the world as just, delude themselves about the se-
curity of their position, convince themselves that racism and colonialism are things of the past that have little impact
on the modern global order, and therefore ignore the problem? By elevating denial of oppression as a normative
standard in the name of promoting well-being, mainstream perspectives ironically leave intact the systems of op-
pression that are the ultimate source of poor well-being in the first place.
Of course, mainstream perspectives in psychology may endorse denial of oppression precisely because they
believe this to be an accurate perception of the status quo. This possibility raises the second problematic issue
with the “perceptual baggage” framing. It identifies tendencies of people from oppressed groups to perceive racism
in everyday affairs as the exotic or deviant tendency that requires explanation, while it elevates denial of racism
to the status of a natural standard: something that does not require explanation because it reflects the objective
perception of the way things are. The implication is that claims about racism in the modern global order are a form
of delusion—a deviation from accurate perception of an objective reality that is relatively free from oppression—that
people from marginalized spaces could avoid if they would just shed their “perceptual baggage.”
In stark contrast to this mainstream pathologization of consciousness about oppression, decolonial responses to
oppression emphasize the importance of consciousness and sober assessment of everyday reality. Of particular
importance for decolonial responses to oppression are varieties of critical consciousness about the socially con-
structed character of everyday realities. Critical consciousness entails the recognition that existing realities are
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not the leading edge of a “just natural” march of human progress or a path to global modernity along which people
in marginalized settings inevitably lag behind. Instead, critical consciousness requires the unflinching awareness
that the modern global order is a product of colonial violence that imposed particular constructions of reality (e.g.,
gender relations, family arrangements, forms of government, modes of livelihood, practices of knowledge, and
other ways of being) as normative standards, displacing the diversity of human life-ways in the process.
The important consequence of this awareness is to de-ideologize everyday realities (Martín-Baró, 1994). One
sense of de-ideologize refers to the moral value aspect of ideology. Rather than the pinnacle of human evolution
to which all communities should aspire, critical consciousness illuminates the foundation of the global modern
order in acts of violence and injustice that call into question its claims to a position of moral superiority. Another
sense of de-ideologize refers to the conceptual knowledge aspect of ideology. Critical consciousness affords the
awareness that the global modern order is not natural or inevitable, but instead is one construction of reality among
many possible others. In turn, the important consequence of de-ideologization of everyday reality is to open the
space for imagination of alternative realities. Once people can imagine alternatives, they can organize activity to
realize those alternative constructions of reality.
Beyond Harmony: Decolonizing “Peace”
A final implication of our discussion for decolonizing psychological science concerns the “prejudice problematic”
(Wetherell, 2011): an emphasis on individual bias as the source of identity-based oppression. Several observers
have noted that the conception of oppression as individual prejudice resonates with a “perpetrator perspective”
in discrimination law (e.g., Freeman, 1977). From this perpetrator perspective, the relevant questions to ask in
situations of potential oppression are (1) whether the actor, as potential perpetrator, performed some act of differ-
ential treatment that reflected antipathy or bias and (2) whether the actor was aware or in control of the action
and meant to do it. If the answer to these questions is no, then it suggests—from the perspective of the perpetrat-
or—that no oppression occurred (cf. Adams, Biernat, Branscombe, Crandall, & Wrightsman, 2008).
Extending the lens beyond the “perpetrator perspective” in discrimination law, one can note how the mainstream
emphasis on the prejudice problematic resonates with the epistemological and ontological perspective of people
in positions of dominance. This conception of oppression is not just the natural reflection of objective reality. Instead,
it reflects neoliberal individualist beliefs and an atomistic ontology, characteristic of people in positions of power
(e.g., Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012), that view action as the source of agentic in-
dividuals abstracted from context.ii Likewise, this conception of oppression is not politically neutral. Instead, it reflects
identity-defensive desires (often outside conscious awareness) to limit the scope of oppression by applying the
concept only to those instances where an actor consciously intended harm motivated by antipathy. This limited
scope excludes from consideration the accumulated consequences of centuries-old actions or cases in which
colorblind, equal, or apparently non-prejudiced realities result in disparate impact. Alternatively stated, this con-
struction treats oppression as isolated acts and directs attention away from broader systems that perpetrate “slow
violence” across larger social, geographic, or temporal scales (see Nixon, 2011). In this respect, the prejudice
problematic—and particularly, a construction of oppression as individual prejudice—constitutes an example of
what Mills (1997, 2007) refers to as an “epistemology of ignorance”: a form of knowledge that affords lack of
consciousness about realities that would otherwise be obvious.
Besides the construction of oppression as individual bias, the prejudice problematic proposes bias-reduction as
the preferred solution to identity-based oppression. Here again, this focus is not politically neutral; instead, by
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deflecting attention away from injustice, and directing energy toward changing hearts and minds, the focus on
bias reduction tends to reflect and promote the interest of ongoing domination (e.g., Adams, Biernat, et al., 2008;
Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Hammack, 2011; Wright & Lubensky, 2008). It delegitimizes moral in-
dignation about the violence of oppression and instead promotes tolerance and harmony as higher moral goods.
This emphasis on tolerance and harmony may indeed be attractive for people who are comfortable with the status
quo. However, if the status quo is the product of injustice and violence, then the call for harmony or peace amounts
to a call to tolerate injustice.iii In one particularly vivid articulation of this idea, mainstream approaches to intergroup
relations hear the calls from the marginalized majority world hungering for social justice, and responds to these
calls with the advice to “let them eat harmony” (Dixon et al., 2010).
In contrast to the mainstream emphasis on prejudice reduction as the solution to oppression, a more liberatory
conception locates the solution in actions that contest material and ideological domination. Those of us who enjoy
the benefits of material and ideological domination are unlikely to surrender these benefits without protest. In such
cases, the presence of conflict and disharmony may be a desirable sign of progress toward justice rather than an
undesirable disturbance of enforced peace that a privileged few enjoy in their gated-community islands of affluent
security amid a sea of extreme inequality and want.
Conclusions
Social psychology has been a primary site of academic research on social justice, and many of us social psycho-
logists identify social justice issues as a topic of our research. Yet, perhaps despite our best intentions, our work
as social psychologists on issues of anti-oppression and social justice typically draws upon conceptual tools that
reflect and reproduce interests of domination. Chief among these conceptual tools is an atomistic understanding
of well-being that abstracts persons from social and historical context. This insidious ideology leads researchers
to focus on how isolated individuals might manage (i.e., cope with) the negative effects of their marginalization,
rather than acting to dismantle oppressive structures that are the source of their marginalization. In turn, by de-
flecting efforts at change away from oppressive systems, mainstream perspectives of social psychological research
contribute to the reproduction of an unjust status quo.
In contrast to the epistemological foundation of mainstream psychological science in sites of global power, per-
spectives of liberation psychology advocate a “preferential option” for the perspective of the oppressed as a priv-
ileged epistemological foundation for a more human(e) psychology. This shift in epistemological perspective
provides important tools to decolonize forms of knowledge, like atomistic conceptions of well-being, that masquerade
as neutral or natural standards to which humanity should aspire. Rather than promote inattention to (or ignorance
about) structural forces of oppression, a decolonial response emphasizes the necessity of critical consciousness
about these structural sources as a precursor to effective action and the construction of more sustainable forms
of well-being. Rather than ask individuals to adapt to their oppressive circumstances in the name of personal (and
social) peace/harmony, the preservation of long-term well-being requires a decolonial response to systems of
oppression that emphasizes the transformation of unjust social systems in the name of justice.
Notes
i) Throughout this paper, we use the general term oppression—prolonged cruel or unjust treatment—as shorthand to refer to
the more specific case of racialized injustice associated with the coloniality of power (e.g., Quijano, 2000): that is, direct,
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systemic, and epistemic forms of violence that result from the lingering effects of European imperialism and colonialism inherent
in the modern global order. Conversely, we use the general term of liberation as shorthand to refer to the specific case of
freedom from such racialized violence.
ii) As decolonial theorists note, this Enlightenment conception of action was not a purely intellectual development divorced
from political economy. Instead, this conception was inextricably implicated in—that is, was both a product of and affordance
for—colonial expropriation and violence. Alternatively stated, the experience of freedom from contextual constraint that
characterizes this dominant subject position came at the cost of increased constraint on the action of the dominated, whose
productive action was a key element of the conditions of possibility that afforded the Enlightenment experience of abstraction
from context and freedom from constraint.
iii) As we worked on this paper, world leaders gathered in South Africa to honor the memory of Nelson Mandela. Observers
of the occasion (e.g., Beinart, 2013;
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/09/nelson-mandela-demanded-justice-before-forgiving-white-south-africans.html)
have noted how American discourse has emphasizedMandela’s efforts as a peace-maker who promoted harmony by forgiving
and embracing his oppressors. American discourse has tended to obscure or minimize Mandela’s efforts as a freedom fighter
who was willing to engage in acts of violence, if necessary, to obtain justice. Of particular relevance for the present analysis,
Beinart (2013) notes that this relatively one-sided portrayal reflects an emphasis on peace and nonviolence in the present
while obscuring truth about past violence that produced the present state of affairs.
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